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Abstract—The proliferation of public Wi-Fi hotspots has
brought new business potentials for Wi-Fi networks, which carry
a significant amount of global mobile data traffic today. In this
paper, we propose a novel Wi-Fi monetization model for venue
owners (VOs) deploying public Wi-Fi hotspots, where the VOs
can generate revenue by providing two different Wi-Fi access
schemes for mobile users (MUs): (i) the premium access, in
which MUs directly pay VOs for their Wi-Fi usage, and (ii) the
advertising sponsored access, in which MUs watch advertisements
in exchange of the free usage of Wi-Fi. VOs sell their ad spaces
to advertisers (ADs) via an ad platform, and share the ADs’
payments with the ad platform. We formulate the economic
interactions among the ad platform, VOs, MUs, and ADs as
a three-stage Stackelberg game. In Stage I, the ad platform
announces its advertising revenue sharing policy. In Stage II, VOs
determine the Wi-Fi prices (for MUs) and advertising prices (for
ADs). In Stage III, MUs make access choices and ADs purchase
advertising spaces. We analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium
(SPE) of the proposed game systematically, and our analysis
shows the following useful observations. First, the ad platform’s
advertising revenue sharing policy in Stage I will affect only
the VOs’ Wi-Fi prices but not the VOs’ advertising prices in
Stage II. Second, both the VOs’ Wi-Fi prices and advertising
prices are non-decreasing in the advertising concentration level
and non-increasing in the MU visiting frequency. Numerical
results further show that the VOs are capable of generating
large revenues through mainly providing one type of Wi-Fi
access (the premium access or advertising sponsored access),
depending on their advertising concentration levels and MU
visiting frequencies.
Index Terms—Wi-Fi pricing, Wi-Fi advertising, Stackelberg
game, revenue sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivations
Global mobile traffic grows unprecedentedly, and is ex-
pected to reach 30.6 exabytes per month by 2020 [2]. Facil-
itated by the recent technology development, data offloading
has become one of the main approaches to accommodate the
mobile traffic explosion. According to the forecast of Cisco,
55% of the global mobile traffic will be offloaded to Wi-Fi and
small cell networks by 2020 [2].
According to the report of Wireless Broadband Alliance
[3], 50% of worldwide commercial Wi-Fi hotspots are owned
by different venues, such as cafes, restaurants, hotels, and
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airports.1 The venue owners (VOs) build public Wi-Fi for
the access of mobile users (MUs), in order to enhance MUs’
experiences and meanwhile provide location-based services
(e.g., shopping guides, navigation, billing) to benefit the VOs’
own business [4].
To compensate for the Wi-Fi deployment and operational
costs, VOs have been actively considering monetizing their
hotspots. One conventional business model is that VOs directly
charge MUs for their Wi-Fi usage. However, as most MUs
prefer free Wi-Fi access, it is suggested that VOs should come
up with new business models to create extra revenue streams
[3]. Wi-Fi advertising, where VOs obtain revenue from ad-
vertisers (ADs) by broadcasting ADs’ advertisements on their
hotspots, has emerged as a promising monetization approach.
It is especially attractive to ADs, as the accurate localization
of Wi-Fi allows ADs to make location-aware advertising.
Furthermore, with MUs’ basic information collected by the
hotspots,2 ADs can efficiently find their targeted customers
and deliver the personalized contents to them.
Nowadays, several companies, including SOCIFI (collab-
orated with Cisco) [5] and Boingo [6], are providing the
following types of technical supports for VOs and ADs on Wi-
Fi advertising. First, they offer the devices and softwares which
enable VOs to display selected advertisements on the Wi-Fi
login pages and collect the statistics information (e.g., number
of visitors and click-through rates). Second, they manage the
ad platforms, where VOs and ADs trade the ad spaces. Once
ADs purchase the ad spaces, VOs and ad platforms share
ADs’ payments based on the sharing policy designed by ad
platforms. Although Wi-Fi advertising has been emerging in
practice, its influence on entities like VOs and MUs, as well
as the detailed pricing and revenue sharing policies, has not
been carefully studied in the existing literature. This motivates
our study in this work.
B. Contributions
We consider a general Wi-Fi monetization model, where
VOs monetize their hotspots by providing two types of Wi-
Fi access: premium access and advertising sponsored access.
With the premium access, MUs pay VOs according to certain
pricing schemes. With the advertising sponsored access, MUs
are required to watch the advertisements, after which MUs
use Wi-Fi for free during a certain period.3 Depending on
the VOs’ pricing schemes, MUs with different valuations on
Wi-Fi access will choose different types of access. When
1Specifically, “Retails”, and “Cafes & Restaurants” are the venues with the
largest number of hotspots (4.5 and 3.3 million globally in 2015, respectively),
followed by “Hotels”, “Municipalities”, and “Airports” [3].
2For instance, when MUs login the public hotspots with their social network
accounts, SOCIFI collects customers’ information, such as age and gender [5].
3As an example, SOCIFI technically supports the premium access as well
as the advertising sponsored access for its subscribed VOs [5].
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Fig. 1: Public Wi-Fi monetization: (a) the premium access: VOs directly
charge MUs; (b) the advertising sponsored access: VOs sell the ad spaces
to ADs via the ad platform, and ADs broadcast their advertisements to MUs.
MUs choose the advertising sponsored access, VOs sell the
corresponding ad spaces to ADs through participating in the
ad platform. Based on the ad platform’s sharing policy δ,
the ad platform and VOs obtain δ and 1 − δ fractions of
the ADs’ payments, respectively. Fig. 1 illustrates the Wi-Fi
monetization ecosystem.
In this work, we will study such a Wi-Fi monetization
system in two parts.
1) Modeling and Equilibrium Characterization: In the first
part of our work, we model the economic interactions among
different decision makers as a three-stage Stackelberg game,
and study the game equilibrium systematically. Specifically, in
Stage I, the ad platform designs an advertising revenue sharing
policy for each VO, which indicates the fraction of advertising
revenue that a VO needs to share with the ad platform. In Stage
II, each VO decides and announces its Wi-Fi price to MUs for
the premium access, and its advertising price to ADs. In Stage
III, MUs choose the access types (premium or advertising
sponsored access), and ADs decide the number of ad spaces
to purchase from the VO.
We analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the
proposed Stackelberg game systematically. Our analysis shows
that: (a) the VO’s advertising price (to ADs) in Stage II is
independent of the ad platform’s advertising revenue sharing
policy in Stage I, as a VO always charges the advertising price
to maximize the total advertising revenue; (b) the VO’s Wi-Fi
price (to MUs) in Stage II is set based on the ad platform’s
sharing policy in Stage I, since a VO will increase the Wi-Fi
price to push more MUs to the advertising sponsored access
if the VO can obtain more advertising revenue.
2) Sensitivity Analysis: In the second part of our work, we
define an equilibrium indicator, the value of which determines
the equilibrium outcomes, such as the ad platform’s sharing
policy and the VO’s Wi-Fi price. Intuitively, the equilibrium
indicator describes the VO’s relative benefit in providing the
premium access over the advertising sponsored access. We
show that when the equilibrium indicator is small, the VO
charges the highest Wi-Fi price to push all MUs to the advertis-
ing sponsored access. On the other hand, when the equilibrium
is large, the ad platform sets the highest advertising revenue
sharing ratio, and the VO mainly generates its revenue from
the premium access.
Furthermore, we investigate the influences of (a) the ad-
vertising concentration level, which measures the degree of
asymmetry in ADs’ popularity, and (b) the visiting frequency,
which reflects the average time that MUs visit the venue. Our
analysis shows that these two parameters have the opposite
impacts on a VO’s pricing strategies: (a) both the VO’s Wi-
Fi price and advertising price are non-decreasing when the
popularity among ADs becomes more asymmetric, and (b)
both prices are non-increasing when MUs visit the VO more
often.
The key contributions of this work are as follows:
• Novel Wi-Fi Monetization Model: To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work studying the advertising
sponsored public Wi-Fi hotspots. We consider a general
Wi-Fi monetization model with both the premium access
and the advertising sponsored access, which enable a VO
to segment the market based on MUs’ valuations, and
maximize the VO’s revenue.
• Wi-Fi Monetization Ecosystem Analysis: We study a Wi-
Fi monetization ecosystem consisting of the ad platform,
VOs, MUs, and ADs, and analyze the equilibrium via
a three-stage Stackelberg game. We show that a VO’s
advertising price is independent of the ad platform’s shar-
ing policy, and a single term called equilibrium indicator
determines the VO’s Wi-Fi price and the ad platform’s
sharing policy.
• Analysis of Parameters’ Impacts: We study the impacts
of the advertising concentration level and the visiting
frequency, and show that they have the opposite impacts
on the equilibrium outcomes. For example, a VO’s Wi-
Fi price and advertising price are non-decreasing in the
advertising concentration level and non-increasing in the
visiting frequency.
• Performance Evaluations: Numerical results show that
the VOs are able to generate large total revenues by
mainly offering one type of Wi-Fi access (the premium
access or advertising sponsored access), depending on
their advertising concentration levels and visiting fre-
quencies.
C. Related Work
Several recent works have studied the business models
related to Wi-Fi networks. Duan et al. in [7] and Musacchio et
al. in [8] studied the pricing schemes of Wi-Fi owners. Yu et
al. in [9] analyzed the optimal strategies for network operators
and VOs to deploy public Wi-Fi networks cooperatively.
Gao et al. in [10] and Iosifidis et al. in [11] investigated
the Wi-Fi capacity trading problem, where cellular network
operators lease third-party Wi-Fi to offload their traffic. Some
other recent works [12]–[16] proposed and analyzed a novel
crowdsourced Wi-Fi network, where Wi-Fi owners collaborate
and share their Wi-Fi access points with each other. Different
from these works, we study the monetization of public Wi-
Fi through the Wi-Fi advertising, and focus on the economic
3interactions among different entities in the entire Wi-Fi ecosys-
tem.
A closely related work on Wi-Fi advertising is [17], where
Bergemann et al. considered an advertising market with ADs
having different market shares. The differences between [17]
and our work are as follows. First, in [17], an MU is only
interested in one AD’s product, while in our model, an MU can
be interested in multiple ADs’ products. Second, in [17], the
authors analyzed the market with an infinite number of ADs,
while in our work, we first analyze the problem with a finite
number of ADs, and then consider the limiting asymptotic case
with an infinite number of ADs. Moreover, in [18], [19], the
authors explored the influence of targeting on the advertising
market. However, none of the works [17]–[19] considered the
ad platform and the associated advertising revenue sharing,
which is a key focus of our study.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we define the strategies of four types of
decision makers in the Wi-Fi monetization ecosystem: the ad
platform, VOs, ADs, and MUs. We formulate their interactions
as a three-stage Stackelberg game.
A. Ad Platform
The ad platform plays two major roles in the ecosystem.
First, it offers the platform for VOs to locate ADs and sell their
ad spaces to ADs. Second, it offers the necessary technical
supports for VOs to display advertisements on their Wi-Fi
hotspots.4 To compensate for its operational cost, the ad
platform can share a fraction of the advertising revenue when
the VOs sell ad spaces to ADs.5
Revenue Sharing Ratio δ: We first consider the VO-
specific revenue sharing case, where the ad platform can set
different advertising revenue sharing ratios for different VOs.
In this case, we can focus on the interaction between the ad
platform and a particular VO without loss of generality, as
different VOs are decoupled. Let δ denote the ad platform’s
revenue sharing policy for the VO, which corresponds to the
fraction of the advertising revenue that the ad platform obtains
when the VO sells the ad spaces to ADs. When the ad platform
takes away all the advertising revenue (i.e., δ = 1), the VO
will not be interested in providing the advertising sponsored
access, and the ad platform cannot obtain any revenue. Hence,
we assume that the ad platform can only choose δ from
interval [0, 1− ], where  is a positive number close to
zero. Mathematically, all results in this paper hold for any
 ∈ (0, 13). The corresponding analysis for this VO-specific
revenue sharing case is given in Sections II to VII.
In Section VIII, we will further discuss the uniform revenue
sharing case, where the ad platform sets a uniform δU ∈
[0, 1− ] for all VOs due to the fairness consideration.
4For example, SOCIFI Media Network is the ad platform managed by
SOCIFI [5]. SOCIFI Media Network collects visitors’ data, provides the
statistics, such as the click-through rates, and supports the ad display in
different formats (e.g., website, video, message).
5As stated in [5], there is no cost for VOs to register SOCIFI Media
Network, which earns profits from sharing the advertising revenue with VOs.
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Fig. 2: Illustration of Wi-Fi Access.
B. VO’s Pricing Decision
The VO provides two types of Wi-Fi access for MUs: the
premium access and the advertising sponsored access.
Wi-Fi Price pf : We assume that the VO charges the
premium access based on a time segment structure: Each time
segment has a fixed length, and the VO charges pf per time
segment. Fig. 2 illustrates such an example, where the length
of one time segment is 30 minutes. If an MU chooses the
premium access for two segments, it pays 2pf , and can use
the Wi-Fi for 60 minutes.
Advertising Price pa: The MU can also use the Wi-Fi for
free by choosing the advertising sponsored access. In this case,
the MU has to watch an advertisement at the beginning of each
time segment.6 To guarantee the fairness among the MUs who
choose the advertising sponsored access, we assume that all
advertisements have the same displaying time. Let pa denote
the advertising price for ADs (for showing one advertisement).
In the example of Fig. 2, the ad display time is 1 minute.
If an MU chooses the advertising sponsored access for two
segments, it needs to watch 2 minutes of advertisements in
total, and can use the Wi-Fi for the remaining 58 minutes free
of charge. Meanwhile, the total payment of ADs is 2pa, which
will be shared by the ad platform and the VO according to the
revenue sharing ratio mentioned before.
In our model, we assume that the advertising price pa is set
by the VO, and this setting has been adopted by the companies,
such as SOCIFI [5]. It is important to note that in the case
where the advertising price pa is set by the ad platform, our
analysis and results will remain unchanged. This is because
the VO and ad platform will choose the same advertising price,
which maximizes the total advertising revenue. Therefore, our
results and conclusions also apply to the scenario where the
ad platform determines the advertising price and sells the ad
spaces to the ADs on behalf of the VO.
C. MUs’ Access Choices
MU’s Payoff and Decision: We consider the operations in a
fixed relatively long time period (e.g., one week).7 Let N > 0
denote the number of MUs visiting the VO during the period.
We use θ ∈ [0, θmax] (θmax > 0) to describe a particular MU’s
valuation on the Wi-Fi connection. We assume that θ follows
the uniform distribution.8
Let d ∈ {0, 1} denote an MU’s access choice, with d = 0
denoting the advertising sponsored access, and d = 1 denoting
6In Boingo’s example, an MU can watch an advertisement in order to access
Boingo’s Wi-Fi networks around 30 minutes [6].
7The time length of the period is chosen such that all the system parameters
introduced in this paper can be well approximated by constants.
8The uniform distribution has been widely used to model MUs’ valuations
on the wireless service [7], [20]. The consideration of other distributions does
not change the main conclusions in this paper.
4the premium access. We normalize the length of each segment
to 1, and define the payoff of a type-θ MU in one time segment
as
ΠMU (θ, d, pf ) =
{
θ (1− β) , if d = 0,
θ − pf , if d = 1, (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1] is the utility reduction factor, and term
1 − β describes the discount of the MU’s utility due to the
inconvenience of watching advertisements.9 For simplicity, we
assume that β is MU-independent. When d = 0, the MU’s
equivalent Wi-Fi usage time during each time segment is 1−β;
when d = 1, the MU pays pf to use the Wi-Fi during the whole
segment. Note that we model the inconvenience of watching
advertisements as a multiplicative cost and the payment for
the premium access as an additive cost. As we will show
in Section III-A, the results obtained under our model are
consistent with the reality, where the MUs with high valuations
on the Wi-Fi connection choose the premium access and the
MUs with low valuations choose the advertising sponsored
access.
Each MU will choose an access type that maximizes its
payoff. Let ϕf (pf ) , ϕa (pf ) ∈ [0, 1] denote the fractions
of MUs choosing the premium access and the advertising
sponsored access under price pf , respectively.
MU Visiting Frequency λ: We further assume that the
number of time segments that an MU demands at the venue
within the considered period (say one week) is a random
variable K, which takes the value from set {0, 1, 2, . . .} and
follows the Poisson distribution with parameter λ > 0.10 We
assume that all MUs visiting the venue have a homogenous
parameter λ. Since λ = E {K}, λ reflects MU visiting
frequency at the venue, and a larger λ implies that MUs visit
the venue more often.
Since the current Wi-Fi technology already achieves a large
throughput, we assume that the capacity of the VO’s Wi-Fi is
not a bottleneck and can be considered as unlimited.11
9In Fig. 2’s example, the time segment length is 30 minutes. If an MU
chooses the advertising sponsored access and its utility is equivalent to the
case where it directly uses Wi-Fi for 20 minutes (which we call equivalent
Wi-Fi usage time) without watching advertisements, parameter β is computed
as 1− 20
30
= 1
3
.
10Poisson distribution has been widely used to model the distribution of
the number of events that occur within a time period [21]. It is a good initial
approximation before we get more measurement data that allow us to build a
more elaborated model of MUs’ behaviors.
11A similar assumption on the unlimited Wi-Fi capacity has been made
in reference [7]. Next we briefly discuss the problem with a limited Wi-
Fi capacity. First, if the capacity is limited but MUs who choose d = 0 and
d = 1 experience the same congestion level, then essentially it will not change
our analysis. Second, if MUs with d = 0 and d = 1 experience different
congestion levels but the difference in the congestion level is a constant, then
the congestion difference can be easily factorized in our model, and also does
not change the results. Third, if MUs with d = 0 and d = 1 experience
different congestion levels and the difference is not a constant, the analysis
will be more complicated, and we plan to investigate this in our future work.
γ=0.5, σmax=5 γ=0.2, σmax=5 
Venue 1: Electronics Store Venue 2: Cafe 
Fig. 3: Comparison of Venues with Different γ.
D. ADs’ Advertising Model
There are M ADs who seek to display advertisements at
the venue.12 We assume that MUs have intrinsic interests on
different ADs’ products. An MU will purchase a particular
AD’s product, if and only if it is interested in that AD’s
product, and has seen the AD’s advertisement at least once.
This assumption reflects the complementary perspective of
advertising [22], and has been widely used in the advertising
literature [17]–[19]. Intuitively, this assumption means that the
advertising does not change the consumers’ preferences, but
becomes a necessary condition to generate a purchase.13
AD’s Popularity σ: We define the popularity of an AD as
the percentage of MUs who are interested in the AD’s product.
Each AD’s popularity at the venue is described by its type σ,
which is uniformly distributed in [0, σmax]. We assume the
popularity of a type-σ AD is
s (σ) , γe−γσ, (2)
where γ ∈ (0, 1] is a system parameter.14 We can show that
s (σ) is decreasing in the type index σ and s (σ) ≤ 1. The
parameter γ measures the advertising concentration level at the
venue, which is defined as the asymmetry of the popularities of
ADs with different type σ. A large γ implies a high advertising
concentration level, since those ADs with small values of σ
have much higher popularities than other ADs.
In Fig. 3, we show different types of ADs’ popularities at an
electronics store and a cafe, respectively. Since the electronics
store is more specialized and most visitors have interests on
the electronics products, the phone AD and computer AD
are much more popular than other types of ADs. Hence, the
12In a more general situation, the ADs may simply send their requests of
displaying advertisements to the ad platform without specifying the specific
venues for the ad display. In this case, the ad platform needs to determine
the distribution of the ADs’ advertisements over different venues by jointly
considering the VOs’ characteristics. We leave the study of this general
situation as our future work.
13Besides the complementary perspective, reference [22] also mentioned the
persuasive perspective, where the advertising alters consumers’ preferences.
We will study the persuasive perspective in our future work.
14Reference [17] used a similar exponential function to model the market
share of a particular AD. However, reference [17] considered a model with an
infinite number of ADs, and directly made assumptions on an AD’s market
share. In our work, we model a finite number of ADs, and use a randomly
distributed parameter σ to describe an AD’s popularity. In Section IV, we first
analyze the VO’s optimal pricing for a finite number of ADs, and then focus
on the limiting asymptotic case with an infinite number of ADs. Therefore,
compared with [17], our model and analysis are different and more reasonable.
5concentration level γ of the electronics store is high. On the
contrary, the cafe is less specialized and has a lower concen-
tration level than the electronics store.
Advertisement Display: Next we introduce the adver-
tisement displaying setting. Recall that the number of time
segments demanded by an MU is Poisson distributed with
an average of λ (segments/MU), and the proportion of MUs
choosing the advertising sponsored access is ϕa (pf ). Hence,
the expected number of ad spaces that the VO has during
the entire time period is λNϕa (pf ). Let m be the number
of advertisements that an AD decides to display at the venue
during the entire time period. If an MU chooses the advertising
sponsored access, then the VO shows an advertisement from
this particular AD to the MU with the following probability
at the beginning of every time segment:15
χ (m, pf ) ,
m
λNϕa (pf )
. (3)
Note that if the VO does not sell out all the ad spaces, the
VO will fill the unsold ad spaces with the VO’s own business
promotions. This is to guarantee the fairness among the MUs
choosing the advertising sponsored access. Specifically, if the
VO does not fill the unsold ad spaces with its own business
promotions, some MUs choosing the advertising sponsored
access may not watch any advertisements or promotions,
which leads to fairness issues among the MUs choosing the
advertising sponsored access.
AD’s Payoff: Next we study a type-σ AD’s payoff. We
name the considered type-σ AD as the tagged AD. We use
ν (m, pf ) to denote the probability of seeing the tagged
AD’s advertisements at least once for an MU choosing the
advertising sponsored access. Next we compute ν (m, pf ).
Recall that the number of time segments that an MU
demands is the discrete random variable K, which follows the
Poisson distribution with parameter λ. Hence, the probability
for an MU choosing the advertising sponsored access to de-
mand K = k time segments is e
−λλk
k! . Assuming that the MU
demands k time segments, hence the conditional probability
that the MU does not see the tagged AD’s advertisements
during these k time segments is (1− χ (m, pf ))k. Therefore,
considering all possibilities of the discrete random variable K,
we have
ν (m, pf ) = 1−
∞∑
k=0
(
e−λλk
k!
(1− χ (m, pf ))k
)
. (4)
Based on the Maclaurin expansion of the exponential function,
we can simplify (4) as
ν (m, pf ) = 1− e
− m
Nϕa(pf) , (5)
which is an increasing and concave function of m. We can
see that ν (m, pf ) in (5) is independent of λ. This is because
λ has two opposite influences on ν (m, pf ). First, when λ
increases, the probability that an MU demands a large num-
ber of time segments increases, which potentially increases
15As shown in the later analysis, the VO will set pa large enough so that
the total number of displayed advertisements does not exceed λNϕa
(
pf
)
.
Hence, the summation of (3) over all ADs will not be greater than 1.
Stage I
The ad platform specifies the revenue sharing policy δ.
⇓
Stage II
The VO specifies the Wi-Fi price pf and ad price pa.
⇓
Stage III
Each MU with type θ ∈ [0, θmax] makes access choice d;
Each AD with type σ ∈ [0, σmax] purchases m ad spaces.
Fig. 4: Three-Stage Stackelberg Game.
ν (m, pf ). Second, when λ increases, the total number of ad
spaces λNϕa (pf ) increases. Based on (3), this leads to the
decrease of χ (m, pf ), which reduces ν (m, pf ). Because the
two opposite influences cancel out, ν (m, pf ) is independent
of λ.
Recall that an MU will purchase the AD’s product, if
and only if the MU is interested in the AD’s product and
has seen the AD’s advertisement at least once. We use
ΠAD (σ,m, pf , pa) to denote a type-σ AD’s payoff (i.e.,
revenue minus payment):
ΠAD(σ,m, pf , pa)=aNϕa (pf )s (σ)ν (m, pf )−pam. (6)
The parameter a > 0 is the profit that an AD generates when
an MU purchases its product,16 Nϕa (pf ) is the expected
number of MUs choosing the advertising sponsored access,
s (σ) is the type-σ AD’s popularity, ν (m, pf ) is the probability
of seeing the AD’s advertisements at least once for an MU
choosing the advertising sponsored access, and pa is the VO’s
advertising price.
E. Three-Stage Stackelberg Game
We formulate the interactions among the ad platform, the
VO, MUs, and ADs by a three-stage Stackelberg game, as
illustrated in Fig. 4. From Section III to Section V, we analyze
the three-stage game by backward induction.
For convenience, we summarize the key notations in Table
I, including some notations to be discussed in Sections III, IV,
and V.
III. STAGE III: MUS’ ACCESS AND ADS’ ADVERTISING
In this section, we analyze MUs’ optimal access strategies
and ADs’ optimal advertising strategies in Stage III. The
MUs and ADs make their decisions by responding to the ad
platform’s revenue sharing policy δ in Stage I, and to the VO’s
pricing decisions pf and pa in Stage II.
A. MUs’ Optimal Access
Equation (1) characterizes an MU’s payoff for one time
segment. Since an MU’s payoff for multiple time segments is
simply the summation of its payoff from each time segment,
an MU’s access choice only depends on its type θ and is
independent of the number of time segments it demands.
Equation (1) suggests that a type-θ MU will choose d = 1
16Since our work focuses on studying the heterogeneity of ADs’ populari-
ties, we assume a is homogeneous for all ADs at the venue.
6TABLE I: Key Notations
Decision Variables
δ ∈ [0, 1− ] Ad platform’s revenue sharing ratio
pf ∈ [0,∞) VO’s Wi-Fi price
pa ∈ [0,∞) VO’s advertising price
d ∈ {0, 1} An MU’s access choice
m ∈ [0,∞) An AD’s ad display choice
Parameters
N ∈ (0,∞) Expected Number of MUs
θ ∈ [0, θmax] An MU’s Wi-Fi valuation (MU type)
β ∈ (0, 1] Utility reduction due to ads
λ ∈ (0,∞) MU visiting frequency
M ∈ (0,∞) Expected Number of ADs
σ ∈ [0, σmax] An AD’s popularity index (AD type)
γ ∈ (0, 1] Advertising concentration level
a ∈ (0,∞) ADs’ unit profit of MUs’ purchasing
η ∈ [0,∞) Popularity of the advertising market
Ω ∈ (0,∞) Equilibrium indicator
Functions
ΠMU (θ, d, pf ) A type-θ MU’s payoff (one segment)
ΠAD (σ,m, pf , pa) A type-σ AD’s payoff
ΠVOa (pf , pa, δ) VO’s revenue from sponsored access
ΠVOf (pf ) VO’s revenue from premium access
ΠAPL (δ) Ad platform’s revenue
ϕf (pf ) Fraction of MUs in premium access
ϕa (pf ) Fraction of MUs in sponsored access
s (σ) A type-σ AD’s popularity
ν (m, pf ) Probability of seeing the tagged AD’s
ads at least once for an MU choosing
the advertising sponsored access
θT (pf ) Threshold MU type
σT (pa) Threshold AD type
Q (pa, pf ) Total number of the sold ad spaces
if θ − pf ≥ θ (1− β), and d = 0 otherwise. Therefore, the
optimal access choice of a type-θ MU is
d∗ (θ, pf ) =
{
1, if θ ≥ θT (pf ) ,
0, if θ < θT (pf ) ,
(7)
where θT (pf ) , min
{
pf
β , θmax
}
is the threshold MU type.
Intuitively, MUs with high valuations on the Wi-Fi connection
will pay for the premium access and use the Wi-Fi for the
whole time segment, while MUs with low valuations will
watch advertisements in order to access Wi-Fi for free.
Since θ follows the uniform distribution, under a price pf ,
the fractions of MUs choosing different types of access are
ϕa (pf ) =
θT (pf )
θmax
and ϕf (pf ) = 1− θT (pf )
θmax
. (8)
B. ADs’ Optimal Advertising
According to (6), a type-σ AD’s optimal advertising prob-
lem is as follows.
Problem 1. The type-σ AD determines the optimal number of
ad displays that maximizes its payoff in (6):
max aNϕa (pf )s (σ)ν (m, pf )− pam (9)
var. m ≥ 0, (10)
where s (σ) is the type-σ AD’s popularity defined in (2).
The type-σ AD’s optimal advertising strategy solving Prob-
lem 1 is:
m∗ (σ, pa, pf ) ={
Nϕa(pf )
(
ln
(
aγ
pa
)
−γσ
)
, if 0 ≤σ ≤ σT (pa) ,
0, if σT (pa)<σ≤σmax.
(11)
Here, σT (pa) is the threshold AD type, indicating whether an
AD places advertisements. It is defined as
σT (pa) , min
{
1
γ
ln
(
aγ
pa
)
, σmax
}
. (12)
We can show that m∗ (σ, pa, pf ) is non-increasing in the
AD’s type σ. The reason is that an AD’s popularity s (σ)
decreases with its type σ. Only for ADs with high popularities,
the benefit of advertising can compensate for the cost of
purchasing ad spaces from the VO.
Moreover, m∗ (σ, pa, pf ) increases with the number of MUs
choosing the advertising sponsored access, Nϕa (pf ). It is
somewhat counter-intuitive to notice that the threshold σT (pa)
is independent of Nϕa (pf ). When Nϕa (pf ) increases, the
number of MUs that both choose the advertising sponsored
access and like the product from an AD with type σ = σT (pa)
indeed increases. While expression (5) implies that since
there are more MUs, the probability for an MU to see the
advertisements from the AD with type σ = σT (pa) decreases.
As a result, the change of Nϕa (pf ) does not affect the number
of ADs who choose to display advertisements at the venue.
When m∗ (σ, pa, pf ) is not an integer, the type-σ AD
can purchase the ad spaces in a randomized manner, and
ensure that the expected number of purchased ad spaces
equals m∗ (σ, pa, pf ). The randomized implementation does
not affect the ad platform’s, VO’s, and MUs’ equilibrium
strategies. It only reduces some ADs’ payoffs, and our numeri-
cal results show that such an influence is minor. We provide the
details about the randomized implementation and numerical
experiments in the appendix.
IV. STAGE II: VO’S WI-FI AND ADVERTISING PRICING
In this section, we study the VO’s advertising pricing pa and
Wi-Fi pricing pf in Stage II. The VO determines its pricing
by responding to the ad platform’s revenue sharing policy δ
in Stage I, and anticipating the MUs’ and ADs’ strategies in
Stage III.
A. VO’s Optimal Advertising Price
We first fix the VO’s Wi-Fi price pf and optimize the
VO’s advertising price pa. We will show that the VO’s
optimal advertising price p∗a is independent of pf . In the next
subsection, we will further optimize pf .
7Let Q (pa, pf ) denote the expected total number of ad
spaces sold to all ADs. According to (11), if pa > aγ,
no AD will purchase the ad spaces and Q (pa, pf ) = 0; if
0 ≤ pa ≤ aγ, we compute Q (pa, pf ) as follows:
Q (pa, pf ) = M
∫ σT (pa)
0
1
σmax
m∗ (σ, pa, pf ) dσ
=
MNϕa (pf )
σmax
(
ln
(
aγ
pa
)
σT (pa)− γ
2
σ2T (pa)
)
, (13)
where M is the number of ADs, and 1σmax is the probability
density function for an AD’s type σ.
We define ΠVOa (pf , pa, δ) as the VO’s expected advertising
revenue, which can be computed as
ΠVOa (pf , pa, δ)=
{
(1−δ)paQ(pa, pf ), if 0≤ pa≤ aγ,
0, if pa > aγ,
(14)
where 1−δ denotes the fraction of advertising revenue received
by the VO under the ad platform’s policy. Based on (14), we
formulate the VO’s advertising pricing problem as follows.
Problem 2. The VO determines the optimal advertising price
by solving
max (1− δ) paQ (pa, pf ) (15)
s.t. Q (pa, pf ) ≤ λNϕa (pf ) , (16)
var. 0 ≤ pa ≤ aγ, (17)
where constraint (16) means that the VO can sell at most
λNϕa (pf ) ad spaces as discussed in Section II-D.
The solution to Problem 2 is summarized in the following
proposition (the proofs of all propositions can be found in the
appendix).
Proposition 1 (Advertising price). The VO’s unique optimal
advertising price p∗a is independent of the VO’s Wi-Fi price
pf and the ad platform’s advertising revenue sharing policy
δ, and is given by
p∗a=

aγe−
√
2λγσmax
M , if λM ≤min
{
γσmax
2 ,1,
2
γσmax
}
,
aγe−(
γσmax
2 +
λ
M ), if γσmax2 <
λ
M ≤ 1,
aγe−(
γσmax
2 +1), if γσmax2 < 1 <
λ
M ,
aγe−2, other cases.
(18)
We observe that the expression of p∗a is sensitive to the
number of ADs M and the parameter of ADs’ popularity
distribution σmax. To reduce the cases to be considered and
have cleaner engineering insights, we will focus on a large
advertising market asymptotics with the following assumption
in the rest of the paper.17
Assumption 1. There are infinitely many ADs in the adver-
tising market, i.e., M →∞, and the lowest popularity among
17Assumption 1 is for the sake of presentations. Without Assumption 1,
there will be seven different regimes (which are divided based on the relations
among λ
M
, γσmax
2
, 2
γσmax
, and 1) that we need to discuss (and we can solve),
and we will not be able to include the full analysis here due to the space limit.
The consideration of finite systems without Assumption 1 does not change
the main results in the later sections. In reference [17], the authors directly
modeled and analyzed the advertising market with an infinite number of ADs.
all types of ADs is zero, i.e., σmax →∞.18
We define p∞a as the VO’s optimal advertising price under
Assumption 1. According to Proposition 1, we show p∞a in
the following proposition.19
Proposition 2 (Advertising price under Assumption 1). Under
Assumption 1, the VO’s unique optimal advertising price p∞a is
independent of the VO’s Wi-Fi price pf and the ad platform’s
advertising revenue sharing policy δ, and is given by
p∞a =
{
aγe
−
√
2λγ
η , if 0 < λ ≤ 2ηγ ,
aγe−2, if λ > 2ηγ ,
(19)
where η , limM,σmax→∞ Mσmax and takes a value in [0,∞).
Next we explain the physical meaning of η. Under Assump-
tion 1, if we randomly pick an MU, the expected number of
ADs that the MU likes is computed as
lim
M,σmax→∞
M
∫ σmax
0
s (σ)
σmax
dσ = lim
M,σmax→∞
M
σmax
= η.
(20)
Hence, η describes the popularity of the advertising market.
Next we discuss how the VO’s advertising price p∞a changes
with λ ∈
(
0, 2ηγ
]
and λ ∈
(
2η
γ ,∞
)
, respectively.
1) Small λ ∈
(
0, 2ηγ
]
: In this case, the advertising price p∞a
decreases with λ. This is because MUs’ small demand rate λ
leads to a limited number of ad spaces. When λ increases, the
VO has more ad spaces to sell, and will decrease p∞a to attract
more ADs. We can verify that the number of sold ad spaces
is λNϕa (pf ), i.e., the VO always sells out all of the spaces.
We call ADs that purchase the ad spaces as active ADs, and
use ρ (p∞a ) to denote the expected number of active ADs. We
can compute ρ (p∞a ) as
ρ (p∞a ) =M
σT (p
∞
a )
σmax
=
√
2λη
γ
, (21)
where σT (p∞a ) is defined in (12). Moreover, the VO’s ex-
pected advertising revenue is
ΠVOa (pf , p
∞
a , δ) = (1− δ) aNϕa (pf )λγe−
√
2λγ
η . (22)
Both (21) and (22) increase with λ when λ is small.
2) Large λ ∈
(
2η
γ ,∞
)
: In this case, the advertising
price p∞a is independent of λ. The reason is that the VO
has sufficient ad spaces to sell, so it can directly set p∞a
to maximize the objective function (15) while guaranteeing
the capacity constraint (16) satisfied. We can verify that the
number of sold ad spaces Q (p∞a , pf ) is
2η
γ Nϕa (pf ), which
is smaller than the capacity λNϕa (pf ).20 Furthermore, the
18From (2), when σmax → ∞, the popularity of a type-σmax AD is
limσmax→∞ s (σmax) = limσmax→∞ γe−γσmax = 0.
19In Section VIII, we show that even without Assumption 1, the p∞a derived
in Proposition 2 achieves a close-to-optimal advertising revenue for most
parameter settings.
20In this case, the VO can fill the unsold ad spaces with its own business
promotions to guarantee the fairness among MUs choosing the advertising
sponsored access.
8expected number of active ADs ρ (p∞a ) is
ρ (p∞a ) = M
σT (p
∞
a )
σmax
=
2η
γ
, (23)
and the VO’s expected advertising revenue is
ΠVOa (pf , p
∞
a , δ) = 2 (1− δ) aNϕa (pf ) ηe−2. (24)
Both (23) and (24) are independent of λ.
Based on (22) and (24), we summarize the VO’s expected
advertising revenue as
ΠVOa (pf , p
∞
a , δ) = (1− δ) aNϕa (pf ) g (λ, γ, η) , (25)
where
g (λ, γ, η) ,
 λγe
−
√
2λγ
η , if λ ∈
(
0, 2ηγ
]
,
2ηe−2, if λ ∈
(
2η
γ ,∞
)
.
(26)
B. VO’s Optimal Wi-Fi Price
Now we analyze the VO’s optimal choice of Wi-Fi pricing
pf . We define ΠVOf (pf ) as the VO’s revenue in providing the
premium access with a given pf .21 Since there are Nϕf (pf )
MUs choosing the premium access and the expected number
of time segments demanded by an MU is λ, we have
ΠVOf (pf ) = λpfNϕf (pf ) . (27)
Based on (25) and (27), we find that pf affects the VO’s
revenue in providing both types of access. The VO’s total
revenue is computed as
ΠVO (pf , δ) = Π
VO
f (pf ) + Π
VO
a (pf , p
∞
a , δ)
= λpfNϕf (pf ) + (1− δ) aNg (λ, γ, η)ϕa (pf ) . (28)
By checking ϕf (pf ) and ϕa (pf ) in (8), we can show that
ΠVO (pf , δ) does not change with pf when pf ∈ [βθmax,∞).
This is because all MUs will choose the advertising sponsored
access if pf ≥ βθmax, and increasing pf in this range will
no longer have an impact on ΠVO (pf , δ). Therefore, we only
need to consider optimizing ΠVO (pf , δ) over pf ∈ [0, βθmax].
This leads to the following optimal Wi-Fi pricing problem.
Problem 3. The VO determines the optimal Wi-Fi price to
maximize its total revenue in (28):
maxλpfNϕf (pf ) + (1− δ) aNg (λ, γ, η)ϕa (pf ) (29)
var. 0 ≤ pf ≤ βθmax. (30)
Solving Problem 3, we obtain the VO’s optimal Wi-Fi
pricing in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Wi-Fi price under δ). Given the ad
platform’s fixed sharing policy δ, the VO’s unique optimal Wi-
Fi price p∗f (δ) is given by
p∗f (δ)=
βθmax
2
+min
{
(1− δ) a
2λ
g (λ, γ, η) ,
βθmax
2
}
. (31)
We can show that p∗f (δ) is non-increasing in δ. When δ
increases, i.e., the fraction of advertising revenue left to the VO
21Notice that the VO’s revenue in providing the premium access is collected
from the MUs, and hence is independent of the VO’s advertising price.
decreases, the VO decreases its Wi-Fi price p∗f (δ) to attract
more MUs to choose the premium access.
V. STAGE I: AD PLATFORM’S REVENUE SHARING
In this section, we study the ad platform’s sharing policy
δ in Stage I. The ad platform decides its sharing policy by
anticipating the VO’s pricing strategies in Stage II and MUs’
and ADs’ strategies in Stage III.
Based on the ad platform’s sharing policy δ ∈ [0, 1− ], the
ad platform and the VO obtain δ and 1−δ fractions of the total
advertising revenue, respectively. Since the VO’s advertising
revenue is given in (25), we compute the ad platform’s revenue
ΠAPL (δ) as
ΠAPL (δ) = δaNϕa
(
p∗f (δ)
)
g (λ, γ, η) , (32)
where p∗f (δ) is the VO’s optimal Wi-Fi price under policy δ,
as computed in Proposition 3. We formulate the ad platform’s
optimization problem as follows.
Problem 4. The ad platform determines δ∗ to maximize its
revenue in (32):
max ΠAPL (δ) (33)
var. 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1− . (34)
In order to compute the optimal δ∗, we introduce an
equilibrium indicator Ω, which affects the function form of
δ∗. We define Ω as
Ω , λβθmax
ag (λ, γ, η)
. (35)
The intuition of Ω can be interpreted as follows. Based on (8)
and (27), the VO’s revenue in providing the premium access
can be written as
ΠVOf (pf ) = λβθmaxNϕf (pf )ϕa (pf ) . (36)
Based on (25), the VO’s revenue in providing the advertising
sponsored access is
ΠVOa (pf , p
∞
a , δ) = ag (λ, γ, η)N (1− δ)ϕa (pf ) . (37)
Next we focus on the system parameters in (36) and (37).
We observe that the terms λβθmaxN and ag (λ, γ, η)N act
as the coefficients for (36) and (37), respectively. Therefore,
intuitively, the indicator Ω in (35) describes the VO’s relative
benefit in providing the premium access over the advertising
sponsored access.
Based on the indicator Ω, we summarize the solution to
Problem 4 as follows.
Proposition 4 (Revenue sharing policy). The ad platform’s
unique optimal advertising revenue sharing policy δ∗ is given
by
δ∗ =

1− , if Ω ∈ (0, ] ,
1− Ω, if Ω ∈ (, 13] ,
1
2 +
Ω
2 , if Ω ∈
(
1
3 , 1− 2
)
,
1− , if Ω ∈ [1− 2,∞).
(38)
We can see that δ∗ ≥ 23 for all Ω ∈ (0,∞). That is to
say, the ad platform always takes away at least two thirds of
9the total advertising revenue. In particular, when Ω ∈ (0, ] or
Ω ∈ [1− 2,∞), the ad platform chooses the highest sharing
ratio, i.e., δ∗ = 1− . Based on our early discussion of Ω, the
VO’s relative benefits in providing the premium access over
the advertising sponsored access under these cases are either
very small or very large. Therefore, even if the ad platform
decreases its sharing ratio δ∗, the VO’s interest in providing
the advertising sponsored access will not significantly increase
in these two cases. As a result, the ad platform chooses the
highest sharing ratio δ∗ to extract most of the advertising
revenue.
Based on Proposition 4, we obtain the VO’s Wi-Fi price at
the equilibrium by plugging δ∗ into the expression of p∗f (δ)
in (31), and summarize it in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Wi-Fi price at the equilibrium). The VO’s
unique Wi-Fi price at the equilibrium is given by
p∗f (δ
∗) =

βθmax, if Ω ∈
(
0, 13
]
,
βθmax
4 +
ag(λ,γ,η)
4λ , if Ω ∈
(
1
3 , 1− 2
)
,
βθmax
2 +
ag(λ,γ,η)
2λ , if Ω ∈ [1− 2,∞).
(39)
According to (8) and Proposition 5, we can compute
ϕa
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)
, i.e., the proportion of MUs choosing the ad-
vertising sponsored access at the equilibrium. We can show
that ϕa
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)
≥ 12 for all Ω ∈ (0,∞). Hence, at least
half of the MUs choose the advertising sponsored access. In
particular, when Ω ∈ (0, 13], we have ϕa (p∗f (δ∗)) = 1,
i.e., all MUs choose the advertising sponsored access. In this
case, the VO has a very small relative benefit in providing the
premium access, and hence it charges the highest Wi-Fi price
p∗f (δ
∗) = βθmax to push all MUs to choose the advertising
sponsored access.22
VI. SOCIAL WELFARE ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the social welfare (SW) of the
whole system at the equilibrium, which consists of the ad
platform’s revenue, the VO’s total revenue, the MUs’ total
payoff, and the ADs’ total payoff. The social welfare analysis
is important for understanding how much the entire system
benefits from the Wi-Fi monetization framework, and how it
is affected by different system parameters. Specifically, we
compute SW as:
SW = ΠAPL (δ∗) + ΠVO
(
p∗f (δ
∗), δ∗
)
+ λN
∫ θmax
0
1
θmax
ΠMU
(
θ, d∗
(
θ, p∗f (δ
∗)
)
, p∗f (δ
∗)
)
dθ
+M
∫ σmax
0
1
σmax
ΠAD
(
σ,m∗
(
σ, p∞a , p
∗
f (δ
∗)
)
, p∗f (δ
∗) , p∞a
)
dσ.
(40)
Here, (i) the first term is the ad platform’s revenue at the
equilibrium, where ΠAPL (δ) is given in (32) and δ∗ is given
22We would like to emphasize that in order to derive clean engineering
insights, our model unavoidably involves some simplifications of the much
more complicated reality. It is hence most useful to focus on the engineering
insights behind the results such as δ∗ ≥ 2
3
and ϕa
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)
≥ 1
2
, instead
of taking the numbers of 2
3
and 1
2
literally.
in Proposition 4; (ii) the second term is the VO’s total revenue
at the equilibrium, where ΠVO (pf , δ) is given in (28) and
p∗f (δ
∗) is given in Proposition 5; (iii) the third term is the
MUs’ total payoff at the equilibrium, where ΠMU (θ, d, pf )
is a type-θ MU’s payoff for one time segment given in (1)
and d∗ (θ, pf ) is given in (7); (iv) the last term is the ADs’
total payoff at the equilibrium, where ΠAD (σ,m, pf , pa) is
given in (6), m∗ (σ, pa, pf ) is given in (11), and p∞a is given
in Proposition 2.
Note that the ADs’ payments for displaying advertisements
are transferred to the ad platform and the VO, and the MUs’
payments for the premium access are collected by the VO.
Therefore, these payments cancel out in (40). As a result, SW
equals the total utility of all MUs and ADs. We show the value
of SW in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Social welfare). The social welfare at the
equilibrium is
SW =
1
2
λNθmax − 1
2
λNp∗f (δ
∗)ϕa
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)
+ ηNϕa
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)(
a− p
∞
a
γ
(
1 + ln
(
aγ
p∞a
)))
, (41)
where p∗f (δ
∗) and p∞a are the VO’s Wi-Fi price given in
Proposition 5 and the VO’s advertising price given in Propo-
sition 2, respectively.
In (41), the first two terms correspond to the total utility
of MUs, and the last term corresponds to the total utility of
ADs. In Section VIII-E, we will investigate the impacts of
parameters γ and λ on the social welfare through numerical
experiments. The numerical results show that the social wel-
fare is always non-decreasing in γ, and is increasing in λ for
most parameter settings.
VII. IMPACT OF SYSTEM PARAMETERS
To understand the Wi-Fi monetization at venues with dif-
ferent features, we analyze the impacts of the advertising
concentration level γ and visiting frequency λ on the equilib-
rium outcomes. Compared with other parameters, these two
parameters can be dramatically different across venues and
hence better reflect the features of the venues.
Proposition 7 (Advertising concentration level γ). We show
the following results regarding the influence of γ:
(i) The VO’s advertising price p∞a in (19) is increasing in
γ;
(ii) The expected number of active ADs ρ (p∞a ) in (21) and
(23) is decreasing in γ;
(iii) The VO’s Wi-Fi price p∗f (δ
∗) in (39) is non-decreasing
in γ;
(iv) The proportion of MUs that choose the premium access
ϕf
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)
is non-increasing in γ.
Items (i) and (ii) of Proposition 7 describe the advertising
sponsored access. A high concentration level γ implies that
the ADs with small σ have much higher popularities than
other ADs. Hence, when γ increases, the ADs with small
σ have larger demand in displaying their advertisements. As
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Fig. 7: Ad Platform’s Revenue ΠAPL.
a result, the VO increases p∞a to obtain more advertising
revenue. On the other hand, the ADs with large σ have smaller
demand in advertising, so the expected number of active ADs
decreases.
Items (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 7 describe the premium
access. A larger γ corresponds to a smaller equilibrium
indicator Ω. Based on the previous discussion in Section
V, this means providing the advertising sponsored access is
more beneficial to the VO. Hence, under a larger γ, the
VO charges a higher p∗f (δ
∗) to push MUs to choose the
advertising sponsored access, which reduces the proportion
of MUs choosing the premium access.
Proposition 8 (Visiting frequency λ). We show the following
results regarding the influence of λ:
(i) The VO’s advertising price p∞a in (19) is non-increasing
in λ;
(ii) The expected number of active ADs ρ (p∞a ) in (21) and
(23) is non-decreasing in λ;
(iii) The VO’s Wi-Fi price p∗f (δ
∗) in (39) is non-increasing
in λ;
(iv) The proportion of MUs that choose the premium access
ϕf
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)
is non-decreasing in λ.
Items (i) and (ii) of Proposition 8 are related to the advertis-
ing sponsored access. According to the discussion in Section
IV, a larger λ means the VO has more ad spaces to sell. Hence,
when λ is larger, the VO chooses a smaller p∞a to attract more
ADs.
Items (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 8 are related to the
premium access. We can show that the equilibrium indicator Ω
increases with λ. Based on the previous discussion in Section
V, a larger indicator means providing the premium access is
more beneficial to the VO. Therefore, with a larger λ, the VO
charges a lower p∗f (δ
∗) to attract MUs to choose the premium
access, which increases the proportion of MUs choosing the
premium access.
According to Propositions 7 and 8, we can observe that
parameters γ and λ have exactly the opposite impacts on the
equilibrium outcomes.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results. First, we
study the optimality of advertising price p∞a in (19) without
Assumption 1. Then we compare the ad platform’s revenue,
the VO’s revenue, the ADs’ payoffs, and the social welfare at
venues with different values of γ and λ. Finally, since the ad
platform may set a uniform sharing policy for multiple VOs in
the practical implementation due to the fairness consideration,
we investigate the uniform revenue sharing case and compare
it with the VO-specific revenue sharing case studied above.
A. Optimality of p∞a without Assumption 1
In Proposition 2, we have shown that p∞a in (19) is the
optimal solution of Problem 2, assuming both M and σmax
going to∞ (Assumption 1). Now we numerically demonstrate
that price p∞a in (19) generates a close-to-optimal advertising
revenue to Problem 2 for most finite values of M and σmax.
For a particular (M,σmax)-pair, we can compute p∞a
by (19),23 and obtain the corresponding advertising rev-
enue ΠVOa (pf , p
∞
a , δ) by (14). Moreover, we can compute
p∗a by (18), and obtain the optimal advertising revenue
ΠVOa (pf , p
∗
a, δ) by (14). We define
ζ , Π
VO
a (pf , p
∞
a , δ)
ΠVOa (pf , p
∗
a, δ)
. (42)
We can show that ζ ∈ [0, 1],24 and ζ characterizes the optimal-
ity of p∞a without Assumption 1. In particular, ζ = 1 implies
that price p∞a generates the optimal advertising revenue.
We choose γ ∼ U [0.01, 1], λ ∼ U [0.1, 5], and a ∼ U [1, 3],
where U denotes the uniform distribution.25 We change M
and σmax from 1 to 15. For each (M,σmax)-pair, we run the
experiment 10, 000 times, and obtain the average ζ.
In Fig. 5, we plot the average ζ against M and σmax. We
observe that the average ζ is always above 0.99 when M ≥ 6
and σmax ≥ 6. That is to say, we have ΠVOa (pf , p∞a , δ) ≥
0.99ΠVOa (pf , p
∗
a, δ) when M ≥ 6 and σmax ≥ 6. Hence, we
summarize the following observation.
23For p∞a in (19), η is defined as limM,σmax→∞
M
σmax
. We can simply
choose η = M
σmax
to compute p∞a for the finite M and σmax situation.
24Specifically, we can show that p∞a in (19) is feasible to Problem 2. Hence,
the advertising revenue under price p∞a , ΠVOa
(
pf , p
∞
a , δ
)
, is no greater than
that under the optimal price p∗a, ΠVOa
(
pf , p
∗
a, δ
)
.
25Since we can show that ζ is independent of pf , δ, and N , we do not
specify the numerical settings for their values.
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Fig. 10: VO’s Total Revenue ΠVO.
Observation 1. Without Assumption 1, the advertising price
computed based on p∞a in (19) can still generate a close-to-
optimal advertising revenue for the VO.
B. Ad Platform’s δ∗ and Revenue with Different (γ, λ)
Next we compare the ad platform’s revenue sharing policy
and revenue for venues with different values of advertising
concentration level γ and MU visiting frequency λ. We choose
N = 200, θmax = 1, β = 0.1, η = 1, a = 4, and  = 0.01.
We will apply the same settings for the remaining experiments
in Section VIII.
Fig. 6 is a contour plot illustrating the ad platform’s revenue
sharing ratio. The horizontal axis corresponds to parameter γ,
and the vertical axis corresponds to parameter λ. The values
on the contour curves are the ad platform’s revenue sharing
ratios, δ∗, computed for venues with different (γ, λ) pairs. The
ad platform needs to strike a proper balance when choosing δ
to maximize its revenue: (a) reduce δ can motivate the VO to
push more MUs towards the advertising sponsored access, at
the expense of a smaller ad platform’s revenue per ad display;
(b) increase δ can improve the ad platform’s revenue per ad
display, at the expense of making the advertising sponsored
access less attractive to the VO. In Fig. 6, the revenue sharing
ratio δ∗ first decreases with λ, then increases with λ, which
means approach (a) is more effective when λ is small and
approach (b) is more effective when λ is large. This is because
a large λ leads to a large indicator Ω, which means that the VO
prefers the premium access, even if the ad platform leaves a
large proportion of the advertising revenue to the VO. Hence,
when λ is large, it is optimal for the ad platform to set a large
δ∗ to take a large fraction of the advertising revenue.
Fig. 7 is a contour plot illustrating the ad platform’s revenue.
We observe that the ad platform obtains a large ΠAPL from
the venue when γ is large (γ > 0.9) and λ is small (1.2 <
λ < 1.8). This parameter combination corresponds to a venue
with a small equilibrium indicator Ω. According to Proposition
5, in this case, the VO chooses the highest Wi-Fi price, i.e.,
p∗f (δ
∗) = βθmax, and hence all MUs choose the advertising
sponsored access. As a result, the total advertising revenue is
large. Furthermore, based on Fig. 6, the ad platform sets a
large sharing ratio (δ∗ > 0.8) in this case to extract most of
the advertising revenue.
We summarize the observations in Fig. 6 and 7 as follows.
Observation 2. The ad platform’s optimal revenue sharing
ratio δ∗ first decreases and then increases with λ. Further-
more, it obtains a large ΠAPL at the venue with both a large
γ and a small λ.
C. VO’s Revenue with Different (γ, λ)
We investigate the VO’s revenue from the advertising spon-
sored access ΠVOa , its revenue from the premium access Π
VO
f ,
and its total revenue ΠVO = ΠVOa + Π
VO
f at venues with
different (γ, λ) pairs.
In Fig. 8, we show the contour plot of ΠVOa . We observe
that a VO with γ > 0.4 and 3.5 < λ < 3.7 has a large ΠVOa .
Based on (25) and Proposition 5, the total advertising revenue
at the equilibrium is aNϕa
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)
g (λ, γ, η). From Propo-
sition 7 (iv) and (26), we can show that both ϕa
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)
and g (λ, γ, η) are non-decreasing in γ. Therefore, the total
advertising revenue at the equilibrium is non-decreasing in γ.
Moreover, from Fig. 6, the ad platform chooses a relatively
small δ∗ (i.e., δ∗ < 0.7) at the venue with γ > 0.4 and
3.5 < λ < 3.7, and hence the VO obtains a large proportion
of the total advertising revenue.
In Fig. 9, we show the contour plot of ΠVOf . We find
that ΠVOf is non-decreasing in λ. The reasons are twofold.
First, as λ increases, the MUs visit the venue more frequently,
and the expected number of time segments requested by the
MUs increases. Second, according to Proposition 8 (iv), the
proportion of MUs choosing the premium access is non-
decreasing in λ.
In Fig. 10, we show the contour plot of ΠVO, which is the
summation of ΠVOa in Fig. 8 and Π
VO
f in Fig. 9. We find
that the VO with both a large γ (γ > 0.4) and a medium
λ (3.5 < λ < 3.9) and the VO with a large λ have large
ΠVO. According to Fig. 8, the former VO mainly generates
its revenue from the advertising sponsored access. According
to Fig. 9, the latter VO mainly generates its revenue from the
premium access.
We summarize the key observations in Fig. 8, 9, and 10 as
follows.
Observation 3. The VO with both a large γ and a medium
λ has a large total revenue, which is mainly generated from
the advertising sponsored access. The VO with a large λ also
has a large total revenue, which is mainly generated from the
premium access.
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Fig. 13: Uniform Ad Revenue Sharing Policy:
VO’s Total Revenue ΠVO.
D. ADs’ Payoffs with Different (γ, λ)
We investigate the ADs’ payoffs at venues with different
(γ, λ) pairs. In Fig. 11, we plot the ADs’ payoffs ΠAD against
the AD type σ under different values of γ and λ. We can
observe that the ADs with higher popularities (i.e., smaller σ)
have higher payoffs. When comparing curves with the same
λ = 1 and different values of γ (0.5 and 1), we find that
the increase of the concentration level γ makes ADs with
small values of σ even more popular, and hence increases
their payoffs. ADs with large values of σ will have smaller
payoffs accordingly. When comparing curves with the same
γ = 0.5 and different values of λ (1, 4, and 7), we observe
that ADs’ payoffs first increase and then decrease with λ.
According to (6), the increase of visiting frequency λ affects
ΠAD in two aspects: (a) from (19), the advertising price p∞a
becomes cheaper, which encourages the ADs to buy more
advertising spaces and hence potentially increases ΠAD; (b)
the VO decreases the Wi-Fi price p∗f (δ
∗) to attract MUs to
the premium access, hence the proportion of MUs choosing
the advertising sponsored access, i.e., ϕa
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)
, becomes
smaller, which potentially decreases ΠAD. In Fig. 11, impact
(a) dominates when λ increases from 1 to 4, and impact (b)
dominates when λ increases from 4 to 7.
We summarize the key observation in Fig. 11 as follows.
Observation 4. ADs obtain large payoffs ΠAD at the venue
with a medium λ, and their payoffs decrease with the index σ.
E. Social Welfare with Different (γ, λ)
We study the impacts of parameters γ and λ on the social
welfare, and show the contour plot of the social welfare in
Fig. 12.
First, we observe that the social welfare is non-decreasing
in the advertising concentration level γ. From (41), we can
prove that the social welfare is independent of γ for γ ≥ 2ηλ ,
which is consistent with the observation here.
Second, we discuss the influence of the MU visiting fre-
quency λ. According to (41), the increase of parameter λ has
the following three impacts on the social welfare. First, each
MU requires more time segments for the Wi-Fi connection,
which increases the MUs’ total utility. Second, as shown in
Proposition 8 (iv), more MUs choose the premium access. In
this case, less MUs need to watch the advertisements (i.e.,
ϕa
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)
decreases), which increases the MUs’ total util-
ity. Third, since more MUs choose the premium access instead
of the advertising sponsored access, the ADs’ total utility
decreases. For most parameter settings, the first two impacts
play the dominant roles. In Fig. 12, we can observe that the
social welfare always increases with λ. However, under a few
extreme parameter settings (e.g., large unit advertising profit
a and utility reduction factor β), the third impact plays the
dominant role, and the social welfare may decrease with λ in
the medium λ regime. We provide a related example in our
technical report [23].
We summarize the key observation in Fig. 12 as follows.
Observation 5. The social welfare is always non-decreasing
in γ. Moreover, the social welfare is increasing in λ, excluding
the medium λ regime.
F. Uniform Advertising Revenue Sharing Policy δU
In Section II-A, we assumed that the ad platform can set
different advertising revenue sharing ratios for different VOs.
This, however, may not be desirable in practice due to the
fairness consideration. In Fig. 13, we consider a more practical
case, where the ad platform chooses a uniform advertising
revenue sharing ratio δU ∈ [0, 1− ] for all VOs.
We assume that VOs have uniformly distributed γ and
λ (γ ∼ U [0.01, 1], λ ∼ U [0.1, 15]), and are identical in
other parameters. We formulate the ad platform’s problem as
follows.
Problem 5. The ad platform decides δ∗U by solving26
max Eγ,λ
{
δUaNϕa
(
p∗f (δU )
)
g (λ, γ, η)
}
(43)
var. 0 ≤ δU ≤ 1− , (44)
where p∗f (δU ) is the VO’s optimal Wi-Fi pricing response
under revenue sharing ratio δU , and is given in (31).
We consider 10, 000 VOs. By solving Problem 5 numeri-
cally, we obtain the optimal δ∗U = 0.81. Fig. 13 is a contour
figure illustrating the VO’s total revenue ΠVO with different
26We obtain the objective function in (43) by taking the expectation of the
ad platform’s revenue ΠAPL (δ) in (32) with respect to γ and λ.
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values of γ and λ under δ∗U = 0.81.
27 Next we compare the
results in Fig. 13 (the uniform revenue sharing case) with those
in Fig. 10 (the VO-specific revenue sharing case).
First, we find that the VO’s total revenue in Fig. 13 always
increases with λ, while the VO’s total revenue in Fig. 10
decreases with λ in some cases (e.g., when γ > 0.4 and
3.9 < λ < 5.6). This is because a larger λ implies that
the MUs request more time segments of Wi-Fi connection
and there are more advertising spaces. In the uniform revenue
sharing case, the ad platform chooses the same sharing ratio,
δ∗U , for all venues. Hence, in Fig. 13, the VO’s total revenue
always increases with λ. In the VO-specific revenue sharing
case, the ad platform’s sharing ratio δ∗ increases with λ for
some λ (as shown in Fig. 6). In this situation, the proportion
of advertising revenue received by the VO decreases with λ,
and hence the VO’s total revenue in Fig. 10 may decrease with
λ.
Second, a VO with a medium λ in Fig. 13 has a smaller
total revenue than that in Fig. 10. Moreover, a VO with a large
λ in Fig. 13 has a larger total revenue than that in Fig. 10.
These are consistent with the comparison between δ∗U here
(the uniform revenue sharing case) and δ∗ in Fig. 6 (the VO-
specific revenue sharing case). For those VOs with δ∗U > δ
∗,
they obtain smaller proportions of the advertising revenue in
the uniform revenue sharing case, so their revenues decrease.
Otherwise, they obtain larger proportions of the advertising
revenue in the uniform revenue sharing case, which increases
their revenue.
We summarize the key observations in Fig. 13 as follows.
Observation 6. The VO’s revenue under the uniform revenue
sharing policy increases with λ. Compared with the VO-
specific revenue sharing policy, the uniform revenue sharing
policy increases the revenue of the VO with a large λ, and
decreases the revenue of the VO with a medium λ.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied the public Wi-Fi monetization
problem, and analyzed the economic interactions among the ad
platform, VOs, MUs, and ADs through a three-stage Stackel-
berg game. Our analysis led to several important observations:
(a) the ad platform’s advertising revenue sharing policy affects
the VOs’ Wi-Fi prices but not the VOs’ advertising prices; (b)
the advertising concentration level γ and the MU visiting fre-
quency λ have the opposite impacts on equilibrium outcomes;
(c) the ad platform obtains large revenues at the venues with
both large γ and small λ; and (d) the VOs with both large
concentration level and medium MU visiting frequency and the
VOs with large MU visiting frequency obtain large revenues.
In our future work, we plan to relax the assumptions of
the uniformly distributed MU types and AD types, and also
consider the MUs and ADs with multi-dimensional hetero-
geneity. For example, the MUs can have heterogeneous utility
27Here, we only show the impact of δ∗U on the VO’s revenue. This is
because it is obvious that the ad platform’s revenue under δ∗U = 0.81 is not
greater than its revenue under δ∗ in the VO-specific revenue sharing case.
Furthermore, as shown in Section IV-A, the advertising price is independent
of the ad platform’s sharing policy. Therefore, the uniform advertising revenue
sharing policy does not affect the ADs’ payoffs.
reduction factors β, besides the heterogeneous Wi-Fi access
valuations θ. The ADs can have heterogeneous unit advertising
profits a, besides the heterogeneous popularity indexes σ.
According to [24], the optimal pricing problem for the multi-
dimensional heterogeneous buyers is generally much more
challenging than that for the single-dimensional heterogeneous
buyers. Moreover, the VOs can organize auctions and let the
ADs bid for the ad spaces. In this situation, the VOs should
allocate the ad spaces to the ADs based on the ADs’ bids and
advertising budgets. We are interested in applying the auction-
based framework (instead of the pricing-based framework
in this paper) to study the trading of the ad spaces, and
investigating the corresponding influence on the equilibrium
outcomes.
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APPENDIX
A. Randomized Implementation of m∗ (σ, pa, pf )
First, we explain the implementation of a non-integer
m∗ (σ, pa, pf ). When m∗ (σ, pa, pf ) is not an integer, the
type-σ AD purchases the ad spaces in a randomized manner
such that the expected number of purchased ad spaces equals
m∗ (σ, pa, pf ). Specifically, we define
mfloor , bm∗ (σ, pa, pf )c, (45)
mceil , dm∗ (σ, pa, pf )e, (46)
κ , m∗ (σ, pa, pf )− bm∗ (σ, pa, pf )c. (47)
Here, mfloor is the largest integer no greater than
m∗ (σ, pa, pf ), mceil is the smallest integer no smaller than
m∗ (σ, pa, pf ), and κ ∈ [0, 1) is the fractional part of
m∗ (σ, pa, pf ). Under the randomized purchasing strategy, the
AD purchases mfloor and mceil ad spaces with the probabilities
1−κ and κ, respectively. In this case, the number of purchased
ad spaces is always an integer (either mfloor or mceil), and the
expected number of purchased ad spaces equals m∗ (σ, pa, pf ).
Second, we show that letting the ADs implement the non-
integer m∗ (σ, pa, pf ) in a randomized manner does not affect
our analysis for the ad platform’s, VO’s, and MUs’ equilibrium
strategies. Under the randomized implementation, a type-σ
AD’s expected number of purchased ad spaces is always
m∗ (σ, pa, pf ). According to equation (13), the randomized
implementation does not affect the expected total number of ad
spaces sold to all ADs Q (pa, pf ). Therefore, the randomized
implementation does not change Problem 2’s analysis, hence
the randomized implementation does not change any of the
later analysis for Stage II and Stage I either
Third, we show that the randomized implementation may re-
duce the ADs’ payoffs, but such an influence is minor. Accord-
ing to (6), a type-σ AD’s payoff function ΠAD (σ,m, pf , pa)
is concave in m. We use ΠADRand (σ,m
∗ (σ, pa, pf ) , pf , pa)
to denote the AD’s expected payoff under the randomized
implementation, which can be computed as follows:
ΠADRand (σ,m
∗ (σ, pa, pf ) , pf , pa) =
(1− κ) ΠAD (σ,mfloor, pf , pa) + κΠAD (σ,mceil, pf , pa) .
(48)
Due to the concavity of ΠAD (σ,m, pf , pa), we have
ΠADRand (σ,m
∗ (σ, pa, pf ) , pf , pa) ≤
ΠAD (σ,m∗ (σ, pa, pf ) , pf , pa) . (49)
That is to say, the randomized implementation may reduce
the AD’s payoff. However, we show that such an influence is
minor. We define
τ (σ) , 1−
ΠADRand
(
σ,m∗
(
σ, p∞a , p
∗
f (δ
∗)
)
, p∗f (δ
∗), p∞a
)
ΠAD
(
σ,m∗
(
σ, p∞a , p∗f (δ∗)
)
, p∗f (δ∗), p∞a
) ,
(50)
which characterizes the relative reduction of a type-σ AD’s
payoff due to the randomized implementation. Next we show
the value of τ (σ) through numerical experiments.
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Fig. 15: ADs’ Optimal Purchasing Strategies.
We consider a period of one week, and assume that N =
1000 and λ = 4. Hence, there are 1000 MUs, and on average
each MU visits the venue four times during the week. For the
remaining parameters, we choose θmax = 1, β = 0.1, γ = 0.5,
η = 1, a = 4, and  = 0.01. We first compute the equilibrium
advertising price p∞a from (19) and the equilibrium Wi-Fi price
p∗f (δ
∗) from (39). Based on (12), the threshold AD type is
σT (p
∞
a ) = 4, which implies that only the ADs with σ ∈ [0, 4)
obtain positive payoffs.
In Fig. 14, we plot τ (σ) against σ ∈ [0, 4]. We observe
that τ (σ) is very small for most values of σ (except when
σ is very close to 4). For example, we have τ (σ) < 10−4
for σ ∈ [0, 3.9] and τ (σ) < 1.1 × 10−2 for σ ∈ [0, 3.99].
Therefore, the influence of the randomized implementation
on the ADs’ payoffs is minor. To understand this, we plot
m∗
(
σ, p∞a , p
∗
f (δ
∗)
)
against σ ∈ [0, 4] in Fig. 15. We
can observe that m∗
(
σ, p∞a , p
∗
f (δ
∗)
)
is a large number for
most values of σ (except when σ is very close to 4). In
this case, the randomized implementation of a non-integer
m∗
(
σ, p∞a , p
∗
f (δ
∗)
)
does not significantly change the AD’s
payoff, and hence the value of τ (σ) is small.
B. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We analyze the solution to Problem 2 by considering
the case σmaxγ2 ≥ λM and the case σmaxγ2 < λM separately.
1) Case A: σmaxγ2 ≥ λM : First, we prove 1γ ln
(
aγ
pa
)
≤
σmax by contradiction. Suppose 1γ ln
(
aγ
pa
)
> σmax. From the
definition of σT (pa) in (12), σT (pa) = σmax. Hence, we can
rewrite Q (pa, pf ) in (13) as
Q (pa, pf ) =
MNϕa (pf )
σmax
(
ln
(
aγ
pa
)
σmax − γ
2
σ2max
)
.
(51)
By using the assumption 1γ ln
(
aγ
pa
)
> σmax, we have the
following relation:
Q (pa, pf ) >
γ
2
σmaxMNϕa (pf ) . (52)
In Case A, we have the relation σmaxγ2 ≥ λM . Hence, we can
derive the following relation from (52):
Q (pa, pf ) > λNϕa (pf ) . (53)
This contradicts with constraint (16) in Problem 2. Therefore,
we have proved that 1γ ln
(
aγ
pa
)
≤ σmax.
Based on 1γ ln
(
aγ
pa
)
≤ σmax and σT (pa)’s definition in
(12), we have σT (pa) = 1γ ln
(
aγ
pa
)
. By plugging σT (pa) =
1
γ ln
(
aγ
pa
)
into the expression of Q (pa, pf ) in (13), we can
rearrange (15)-(17) as follows:
max (1− δ) paMNϕa (pf )
2σmaxγ
(
ln
(
aγ
pa
))2
(54)
s.t. pa ≥ aγe−
√
2λγσmax
M , (55)
var. 0 ≤ pa ≤ aγ. (56)
We can prove that the objective function (54) is unimodal: it
increases with pa for pa ∈
[
0, aγe−2
]
and decreases with pa
for pa ∈
(
aγe−2, aγ
]
. By considering constraint (55), we can
show the solution to Problem 2 as follows:
p∗a =
{
aγe−
√
2λγσmax
M , if λM ≤ 2γσmax ,
aγe−2, if λM >
2
γσmax
.
(57)
Because the condition σmaxγ2 ≥ λM holds under Case A and
min
{
γσmax
2 ,
2
γσmax
}
≤ 1, we can rewrite (57) as
p∗a =
{
aγe−
√
2λγσmax
M , if λM ≤ min
{
γσmax
2 , 1,
2
γσmax
}
,
aγe−2, if γσmax2 ≥ λM > 2γσmax .
(58)
2) Case B: σmaxγ2 <
λ
M : In this case, σT (pa) has different
expressions for the regime pa ∈ [0, aγe−γσmax ] and regime
pa ∈ (aγe−γσmax , aγ]. Next we discuss the VO’s optimal
pricing in these two regimens separately.
Regime 1: pa ∈ [0, aγe−γσmax ]: In this regime, we can
show that 1γ ln
(
aγ
pa
)
≥ σmax. From (12), σT (pa) = σmax. By
plugging σT (pa) = σmax into the expression of Q (pa, pf ) in
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(13), we can rearrange (15)-(17) as follows:
max (1− δ) paMNϕa (pf )
σmax
(
ln
(
aγ
pa
)
σmax − γ
2
σ2max
)
(59)
s.t. pa ≥ aγe−(
γσmax
2 +
λ
M ), (60)
var. 0 ≤ pa ≤ aγe−γσmax . (61)
We can prove that the objective function (59) is unimodal:
it increases for pa ∈
[
0, aγe−(
γσmax
2 +1)
]
and decreases for
pa ∈
(
aγe−(
γσmax
2 +1), aγ−γσmax
]
. By considering (60) and
(61), we show the optimal p∗a and the corresponding revenue
ΠVOa (pf , p
∗
a, δ) in Regime 1 as follows:
(a) If 1 ≥ λM > γσmax2 , we have p∗a = aγe−(
γσmax
2 +
λ
M ) and
ΠVOa (pf , p
∗
a, δ) = (1− δ) aγe−(
γσmax
2 +
λ
M )Nϕa (pf )λ;
(b) If λM >
γσmax
2 ≥ 1, we have p∗a = aγe−γσmax and
ΠVOa (pf , p
∗
a, δ) = (1− δ) aγ
2e−γσmaxσmax
2 MNϕa (pf );
(c) If λM > 1 >
γσmax
2 , we have p
∗
a = aγe
−( γσmax2 +1) and
ΠVOa (pf , p
∗
a, δ) = (1− δ) aγe−(
γσmax
2 +1)MNϕa (pf ).
Regime 2: pa ∈ (aγe−γσmax , aγ]: In this regime, we have
1
γ ln
(
aγ
pa
)
< σmax. From (12), σT (pa) = 1γ ln
(
aγ
pa
)
. By
plugging it into the expression of Q (pa, pf ) in (13), we can
rearrange (15)-(17) as follows:
max (1− δ) paMNϕa (pf )
2σmaxγ
(
ln
(
aγ
pa
))2
(62)
s.t. pa ≥ aγe−
√
2λγσmax
M , (63)
var. aγe−γσmax ≤ pa ≤ aγ. (64)
The objective function (62) is the same as (54), which in-
creases with pa for pa ∈
[
0, aγe−2
]
and decreases with pa
for pa ∈
(
aγe−2, aγ
]
. By considering (63) and (64), we show
the optimal p∗a and the corresponding revenue Π
VO
a (pf , p
∗
a, δ)
in Regime 2 as follows:
(a) If λM >
γσmax
2 ≥ 1, we have p∗a = aγe−2 and
ΠVOa (pf , p
∗
a, δ) =
2(1−δ)MNϕa(pf )ae−2
σmax
;
(b) If min
{
λ
M , 1
}
> γσmax2 , we have p
∗
a = aγe
−γσmax and
ΠVOa (pf , p
∗
a, δ) =
(1−δ)MNϕa(pf )ae−γσmaxγ2σmax
2 .
Combination of Regime 1 and Regime 2: Next we combine
the optimal solutions in Regime 1 and Regime 2. Based on
the comparison of ΠVOa (pf , p
∗
a, δ) in Regime 1 and Regime
2, we can show that:
p∗a =

aγe−(
γσmax
2 +
λ
M ), if 1 ≥ λM > γσmax2 ,
aγe−2, if λM >
γσmax
2 ≥ 1,
aγe−(
γσmax
2 +1) if λM > 1 >
γσmax
2 .
(65)
3) Combination of Case A and Case B: Finally, we show
the solution based on the analysis in Case A and Case B. From
(58) and (65), we can obtain
p∗a=

aγe−
√
2λγσmax
M , if λM ≤min
{
γσmax
2 ,1,
2
γσmax
}
,
aγe−(
γσmax
2 +
λ
M ), if γσmax2 <
λ
M ≤ 1,
aγe−(
γσmax
2 +1), if γσmax2 < 1 <
λ
M ,
aγe−2, other cases,
(66)
which completes the proof of Proposition 1.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The VO’s optimal advertising price under general
σmax and M is given in (18). With Assumption 1, we have
σmax → ∞. Hence, the conditions γσmax2 < λM ≤ 1 and
γσmax
2 < 1 <
λ
M do not hold. Furthermore, the condition
λ
M ≤min
{
γσmax
2 ,1,
2
γσmax
}
can be simplified as λM ≤ 2γσmax .
Using η = limM,σmax→∞
M
σmax
, we can further rewrite this
condition as λ ≤ 2ηγ . Therefore, the optimal advertising price
under Assumption 1 is simply
p∞a =
{
aγe
−
√
2λγ
η , if 0 < λ ≤ 2ηγ ,
aγe−2, if λ > 2ηγ .
(67)
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The objective function (29) is a quadratic function of
pf . We can show that the objective function increases with
pf for pf ∈
[
0, βθmax2 + (1− δ) ag(λ,γ,η)2λ
]
and decreases with
pf for pf ∈
(
βθmax
2 + (1− δ) ag(λ,γ,η)2λ ,∞
)
. From (30), pf ∈
[0, βθmax]. Hence, we can compute the optimal Wi-Fi price
under the sharing policy δ as
p∗f (δ) = min
{
βθmax,
βθmax
2
+
(1−δ)a
2λ
g (λ, γ, η)
}
. (68)
We can rearrange (68) as
p∗f (δ)=
βθmax
2
+min
{
(1− δ) a
2λ
g (λ, γ, η) ,
βθmax
2
}
, (69)
which completes the proof of Proposition 3.
E. Proofs of Proposition 4 and Proposition 5
Proof. We discuss the ad platform’s sharing policy and the
VO’s Wi-Fi price at the equilibrium in the following four
cases: Ω ∈ (0, ], Ω ∈ (, 13], Ω ∈ ( 13 , 1− 2), and
Ω ∈ [1− 2,∞).
1) Case A: Ω ∈ (0, ]: In this case, 1 −  ≤ 1 − Ω. Since
δ ∈ [0, 1− ], we have δ ≤ 1 − Ω. By using Ω = λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) ,
we can rearrange δ ≤ 1 − Ω as (1− δ) ag(λ,γ,η)2λ ≥ βθmax2 .
Based on (31), this implies that p∗f (δ) = βθmax. Then we can
rewrite Problem 4 as
max δaNg (λ, γ, η) (70)
var. 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1− . (71)
We can easily show that at the equilibrium the optimal sharing
policy is δ∗ = 1 − , and the VO’s Wi-Fi price is p∗f (δ∗) =
βθmax.
2) Case B: Ω ∈ (, 13]: In this case, we discuss δ ∈
[0, 1− Ω] and δ ∈ (1− Ω, 1− ] separately.
(a) When δ ∈ [0, 1− Ω], we can show p∗f (δ) = βθmax
based on (31). From (32), the ad platform’s revenue is
ΠAPL (δ) = δaNg (λ, γ, η). Hence, we can easily obtain the
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optimal sharing policy δ∗ = 1 − Ω, and compute the corre-
sponding revenue as ΠAPL (δ∗) = ag (λ, γ, η)N −λβθmaxN .
(b) When δ ∈ (1− Ω, 1− ], we can show p∗f (δ) = βθmax2 +
(1−δ)βθmax
2Ω based on (31). According to (32), we can compute
the ad platform’s revenue as
ΠAPL (δ) =
aNg (λ, γ, η)
2
δ
(
1 +
1− δ
Ω
)
. (72)
This is a quadratic function of δ, and we can prove that the ad
platform’s revenue is always below ag (λ, γ, η)N−λβθmaxN
for all δ ∈ (1− Ω, 1− ].
Summarizing (a) and (b), we show that in Case B, the
optimal sharing policy is δ∗ = 1 − Ω, and the VO’s Wi-Fi
price is p∗f (δ
∗) = βθmax.
3) Case C: Ω ∈ ( 13 , 1− 2): In this case, we discuss δ ∈
[0, 1− Ω] and δ ∈ (1− Ω, 1− ] separately.
(a) When δ ∈ [0, 1− Ω], the analysis is the same as item
(a) of Case B. The ad platform’s optimal sharing policy is
δ∗ = 1 − Ω, and the corresponding revenue is ΠAPL (δ∗) =
ag (λ, γ, η)N − λβθmaxN .
(b) When δ ∈ (1− Ω, 1− ], the ad platform’s revenue
function ΠAPL (δ) is the same as (72). We can easily show
that function ΠAPL (δ) achieves the maximum value at point
δ = 1+Ω2 . Furthermore, from Ω ∈
(
1
3 , 1− 2
)
(condition of
Case C), we can prove that 1+Ω2 ∈ (1− Ω, 1− ). Therefore,
the ad platform’s optimal sharing policy is δ∗ = 1+Ω2 , and the
corresponding revenue is ΠAPL (δ∗) = ag(λ,γ,η)N2
(Ω+1)2
4Ω .
Next we summarize (a) and (b). We can show that the
value of ΠAPL (δ∗) in (b) is greater than that in (a). As a
result, in Case C, the optimal sharing policy is δ∗ = 1+Ω2 , and
the corresponding Wi-Fi price can be computed as p∗f (δ
∗) =
βθmax
4 +
ag(λ,γ,η)
4λ .
4) Case D: Ω ∈ [1− 2,∞): In this case, we discuss δ ∈
[0, 1− Ω] and δ ∈ (1− Ω, 1− ] separately.
(a) When δ ∈ [0, 1− Ω], the analysis is the same as item
(a) of Case B. The ad platform’s optimal sharing policy is
δ∗ = 1 − Ω, and the corresponding revenue is ΠAPL (δ∗) =
ag (λ, γ, η)N − λβθmaxN .
(b) When δ ∈ (1− Ω, 1− ], the ad platform’s revenue
function ΠAPL (δ) is the same as (72). We can easily prove
that ΠAPL (δ) increases with δ for δ ∈ (1− Ω, 1− ]. Hence,
the optimal sharing policy is δ∗ = 1−, and the corresponding
revenue is ΠAPL (δ∗) = aNg(λ,γ,η)2 (1− )
(
1 + Ω
)
.
Next we summarize (a) and (b). We can show that the value
of ΠAPL (δ∗) in (b) is greater than that in (a). As a result,
in Case D, the ad platform’s optimal sharing policy is δ∗ =
1− , and the corresponding Wi-Fi price can be computed as
p∗f (δ
∗) = βθmax2 +
ag(λ,γ,η)
2λ .
Summarizing Case A, Case B, Case C, and Case D, we
complete the proofs of Proposition 4 and Proposition 5.
F. Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. First, we compute the total utility of MUs. If a type-θ
MU chooses the premium access, its utility for connecting Wi-
Fi for one time segment is θ; otherwise, its utility for connect-
ing Wi-Fi for one time segment is (1− β) θ. Under the VO’s
Wi-Fi price p∗f (δ
∗), the MUs with types in
[
0, θT
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
))
choose the advertising sponsored access, and the MUs with
types in
[
θT
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)
, θmax
]
choose the premium access.
Therefore, we can compute the MUs’ total utility as
λN
∫ θT (p∗f (δ∗))
0
(1− β) θ
θmax
dθ + λN
∫ θmax
θT (p∗f (δ∗))
θ
θmax
dθ
=
1
2
λNθmax − 1
2
λNp∗f (δ
∗)ϕa
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)
. (73)
Second, we compute the total utility of ADs. Under the
VO’s advertising price p∞a , only the ADs with types in
[0, σT (p
∞
a )] purchase the ad spaces, and the amounts of
purchased ad spaces are given in (11). Hence, we can compute
the ADs’ total utility as
aNϕa
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)
M
∫ σT (p∞a )
0
γe−γσ
σmax
(
1− e− ln
(
aγ
p∞a
)
+γσ
)
dσ
= ηNϕa
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)(
a− p
∞
a
γ
(
1 + ln
(
aγ
p∞a
)))
. (74)
Since the social welfare equals the total utility of MUs and
ADs, we obtain the social welfare by combining the MUs’
total utility in (73) and the AD’s total utility in (74). This
completes the proof.
G. Proof of Proposition 7
1) Proof of Item (i): The VO’s advertising price p∞a is given
in (19). We find that p∞a is continuous in γ for γ ∈ (0,∞).
Furthermore, by checking ∂p
∞
a
∂γ , we can show that p
∞
a is
increasing in γ for γ ∈ (0, 2ηλ ) and γ ∈ ( 2ηλ ,∞). Hence, the
VO’s advertising price p∞a is increasing in γ for γ ∈ (0,∞).
2) Proof of Item (ii): According to (21) and (23), ρ (p∞a )
is continuous at point γ = 2ηλ . Furthermore, we can prove that
ρ (p∞a ) is decreasing in γ for γ ∈
(
0, 2ηλ
)
and γ ∈ ( 2ηλ ,∞).
Hence, we can show that ρ (p∞a ) is decreasing in γ for γ ∈
(0,∞).
3) Proof of Item (iii): First, we show some properties
for λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) . Based on (26), we can show that
λβθmax
ag(λ,γ,η) is
continuous in γ for γ ∈ (0,∞). Furthermore, we can show
that λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) is strictly decreasing in γ for γ ∈
(
0, 2ηλ
)
,
and does not change with γ for γ ∈ ( 2ηλ ,∞). We can also
prove that limγ→0+
λβθmax
ag(λ,γ,η) =∞ (i.e., for any V > 0, there
exists a ξ > 0 such that λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) > V for all γ ∈ (0, ξ))
and λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) =
λβθmax
a2ηe−2 for all γ ∈
[
2η
λ ,∞
)
. Therefore, for
any value W ∈
(
λβθmax
a2ηe−2 ,∞
)
, we can always find a unique
γ0 ∈ (0,∞) such that λβθmaxag(λ,γ0,η) = W .
We can prove Item (iii) by considering the following three
situations separately: λβθmaxa2ηe−2 <
1
3 ,
1
3 ≤ λβθmaxa2ηe−2 < 1 − 2,
and λβθmaxa2ηe−2 ≥ 1 − 2. Next we discuss the situation where
λβθmax
a2ηe−2 <
1
3 . The situations where
1
3 ≤ λβθmaxa2ηe−2 < 1− 2 and
λβθmax
a2ηe−2 ≥ 1− 2 can be analyzed in similar approaches.
Since  ∈ (0, 13), we have 13 < 1− 2. When λβθmaxa2ηe−2 < 13 ,
we have λβθmaxa2ηe−2 <
1
3 < 1 − 2. Based on the analysis of
λβθmax
ag(λ,γ,η) above, we can always find unique γ1 and γ2 such
that λβθmaxag(λ,γ1,η) = 1 − 2 and
λβθmax
ag(λ,γ2,η)
= 13 . Moreover, we
have γ1 < γ2.
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Based on the monotonicity of λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) , we can show
that λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) ∈ [1− 2,∞) for γ ∈ (0, γ1], λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) ∈(
1
3 , 1− 2
)
for γ ∈ (γ1, γ2), and λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) ∈
[
λβθmax
a2ηe−2 ,
1
3
]
for
γ ∈ [γ2,∞). Notice that Ω = λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) . From Proposition 5,
we can easily derive that
p∗f (δ
∗) =

βθmax
2 +
ag(λ,γ,η)
2λ , if γ ∈ (0, γ1] ,
βθmax
4 +
ag(λ,γ,η)
4λ , if γ ∈ (γ1, γ2) ,
βθmax, if γ ∈ [γ2,∞) .
(75)
According to (26), g (λ, γ, η) is non-decreasing in γ for γ ∈
(0,∞). Hence, from (75), we can easily show that p∗f (δ∗)
is non-decreasing in γ for γ ∈ (0, γ1], (γ1, γ2), or [γ2,∞).
Moreover, from (75), p∗f (δ
∗) is continuous at point γ = γ1
and point γ = γ2. Therefore, we show that p∗f (δ
∗) is non-
decreasing in γ for γ ∈ (0,∞).
For situations 13 ≤ λβθmaxa2ηe−2 < 1− 2 and λβθmaxa2ηe−2 ≥ 1− 2,
we can apply similar approaches and show that p∗f (δ
∗) is also
non-decreasing in γ for γ ∈ (0,∞).
4) Proof of Item (iv): Based on (8), we have ϕf (pf ) =
1 − pfβθmax for pf ∈ [0, βθmax]. Since we have shown that
p∗f (δ
∗) is non-decreasing in γ, we can show that ϕf
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)
is non-increasing in γ for γ ∈ (0,∞).
H. Proof of Proposition 8
1) Proof of Item (i): From (19), we can show that p∞a is
continuous in λ for λ ∈ (0,∞). Moreover, it is decreasing in
λ for λ ∈
(
0, 2ηγ
)
, and is independent of λ for λ ∈
(
2η
γ ,∞
)
.
Therefore, the VO’s advertising price p∞a is non-increasing in
λ for λ ∈ (0,∞).
2) Proof of Item (ii): Based on (21) and (23), ρ (p∞a )
is continuous at point λ = 2ηγ . Furthermore, ρ (p
∞
a ) is
increasing in λ for λ ∈
(
0, 2ηγ
)
, and is independent of λ
for λ ∈
(
2η
γ ,∞
)
. Hence, we can show that ρ (p∞a ) is non-
decreasing in λ for λ ∈ (0,∞).
3) Proof of Item (iii): Based on (26), we can rewrite
λβθmax
ag(λ,γ,η) as
λβθmax
ag (λ, γ, η)
=
{
βθmax
aγ e
√
2λγ
η , if 0 < λ ≤ 2ηγ ,
βθmax
2aηe−2λ, if λ >
2η
γ .
(76)
From (76), we can easily show that λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) is continuous and
strictly increasing in λ for λ ∈ (0,∞). Furthermore, we can
find that limλ→0+
λβθmax
ag(λ,γ,η) =
βθmax
aγ and limλ→∞
λβθmax
ag(λ,γ,η) =
∞. Therefore, for any value W ∈
(
βθmax
aγ ,∞
)
, we can find a
unique λ ∈ (0,∞) such that λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) = W .
We can prove Item (iii) by considering the following three
situations separately: βθmaxaγ <
1
3 ,
1
3 ≤ βθmaxaγ < 1 − 2, and
βθmax
aγ ≥ 1−2. Next we discuss the situation where βθmaxaγ <
1
3 . The situations where
1
3 ≤ βθmaxaγ < 1 − 2 and βθmaxaγ ≥
1− 2 can be analyzed in similar approaches.
Since  ∈ (0, 13), we have 13 < 1 − 2. When βθmaxaγ < 13 ,
we have βθmaxaγ <
1
3 < 1 − 2. Based on the analysis above,
we can always find unique λ1 and λ2 such that λβθmaxg(λ1,γ,η) =
1
3
and λβθmaxg(λ2,γ,η) = 1− 2. Also, we can show that λ1 < λ2.
Based on the monotonicity of λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) , we can show
that λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) ∈
(
βθmax
aγ ,
1
3
]
for λ ∈ (0, λ1], λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) ∈(
1
3 , 1− 2
)
for λ ∈ (λ1, λ2), and λβθmaxag(λ,γ,η) ∈ [1− 2,∞) for
λ ∈ [λ2,∞). From Proposition 5, we can easily derive that
p∗f (δ
∗) =

βθmax, if λ ∈ (0, λ1] ,
βθmax
4 +
ag(λ,γ,η)
4λ , if λ ∈ (λ1, λ2) ,
βθmax
2 +
ag(λ,γ,η)
2λ , if λ ∈ [λ2,∞).
(77)
From (26), we can easily show that g(λ,γ,η)λ is decreasing in
λ. Based on (77), we can prove that p∗f (δ
∗) is non-increasing
in λ for λ ∈ (0, λ1], (λ1, λ2), or [λ2,∞). Moreover, we can
prove that p∗f (δ
∗) is continuous at point λ = λ1 and point
λ = λ2. Therefore, we show that p∗f (δ
∗) is non-increasing in
λ for λ ∈ (0,∞).
4) Proof of Item (iv): According to (8), we have ϕf (pf ) =
1 − pfβθmax for pf ∈ [0, βθmax]. Since we have shown that
p∗f (δ
∗) is non-increasing in λ, we can show that ϕf
(
p∗f (δ
∗)
)
is non-decreasing in λ for λ ∈ (0,∞).
I. Example of λ’s Impact on SW
In this section, we show an example where the social
welfare may decrease with λ for some medium λ. We choose
N = 200, θmax = 1, β = 0.8, η = 1, a = 20,  = 0.01, and
γ = 0.8. We change λ from 0.01 to 15, and plot the social
welfare against λ in Fig. 16. We can observe that the social
welfare decreases with λ for 2.3 < λ < 6.6.
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Fig. 16: A Special Example of λ’s Impact on Social Welfare.
